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Abstract
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when
there is a secondary market with market power and the ﬁrms have private information. Based on
real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a
Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each ﬁrm anticipates his role in the secondary
market, which aﬀects the ﬁrms’ valuation of the permits (that are not common across ﬁrms) as well
as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-eﬀective allocation of
permits, as it would occur in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-eﬀective
than grandfathering when the ﬁrms’ costs are asymmetric enough, especially if the follower has lower
abatement costs than the leader and uncertainty about the marginal costs is large enough. If market
power spills over the auction, the latter is always less cost-eﬀective than grandfathering. One central
policy implication is that the speciﬁc design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-eﬀectiveness.
The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting
the market power that is present in the secondary market.
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Introduction

Most economists tend to favour auctioning of emission permits while business tend to prefer a grandfathering scheme, as noted for example by Hepburn et al. (2006). Until very recently, auctioning has been
the exception rather than the rule, while grandfathering has been, by far, the most widespread method
used to distribute emission permits. Nevertheless, the situation is changing and it could change even more
dramatically in the coming future.
For the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), considered to be the largest environmental market in the world, the role of auctioning is becoming increasingly relevant. The 2008 revision of
the European Emission Trading Directive established as a fundamental change for the third trading period, starting in 2013, the mandate that auctioning of allowances will be the default method for allocating
allowances. From 2013 onwards all allowances not allocated for free must be auctioned and auctioning
will progressively replace grandfathering as the main method in all EU-ETS sectors except aviation. It is
expected that roughly half of the allowances will be auctioned. This is in sharp contrast to the ﬁrst trading period (2005-2007) in which a 5% limit was set to the amount of allowances that could be auctioned.
Moreover, only four countries used auctions at all and only Denmark used up the 5% limit. The situation
in the second trading period (2008-2012) was not very diﬀerent, with no more than 4% of all the allowances
auctioned. The arguments posed by the European Commission (EC) to support the introduction of auctions in the third period are that auctioning "best ensures the eﬃciency, transparency and simplicity of
the system, creates the greatest incentives for investment in a low-carbon economy and eliminates windfall
proﬁts".1
The world ﬁrst CO2 cap-and-trade system to require the widespread use of auctions was the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). This programme began in 2009, it includes the 10 northeastern US
states as well as Eastern Canada and it covers CO2 emissions from electricity generators. As noted by
Burtraw et al. (2009), the RGGI proposal represents a substantial break with the past since, instead of
giving the permits away for free, the RGGI states decided to auction close to 90 percent of their permit
budgets. The increasing role of auctioning supported by these examples is an important motivation to
analyze the role of auctions as an allocation mechanism for emission permits.
In this paper, we try to get some insight into the properties of auctioning versus grandfathering.
Speciﬁcally, we start from the EC’s argument to support the introduction of auctioning on the grounds
of eﬃciency. The eﬃciency of an environmental policy requires a) enforcing the "right" (eﬃcient) amount
of emissions (considering both the abatement costs and the externalities caused by pollution) and b)
distributing those emissions among emitters in a cost-eﬀective way. In this paper, we disregard the former
issue by assuming that the amount of permits is exogenously decided and we focus on the second dimension,
1 See

http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/faq_en.htm, section "Why are allowances being auctioned?".
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i.e., the right way of distributing permits among polluting ﬁrms. Summing up, our central research question
is: can auctioning distribute permits in a more cost-eﬀective way than grandfathering? So, we focus on
cost-eﬀectiveness, which is a necessary (although not suﬃcient) condition for eﬃciency.
It is well known that, under perfect competition and full information, the initial allocation of permits
only matters for the distribution of the gains from trade, but it is irrelevant for the ﬁnal allocation and,
hence, for cost-eﬀectiveness (see, for example, Tietenberg 2006). Nevertheless, as ﬁrst noted by Hahn
(1984), if there is market power, the initial distribution of permits does matter for the sake of costeﬀectiveness. Indeed, the cost-eﬀective allocation will be reached only when, in the initial allocation, the
leader receives exactly the amount of permits that he would receive under perfectly competitive pricing.
So, on the grounds of cost-eﬀectiveness, the EC’s argument for auctioning only makes sense under the
implicit recognition that there is not a perfect market for permits since, otherwise, no eﬃciency gains
could be made by changing the allocation method.
Sturn (2008) notes that whether market power actually constitutes a problem in an emission trading
system has to be analyzed for each market separately. Market power is probably not one of the main issues
in the EU ETS since the number of involved facilities is very large, but it may constitute a serious problem
for future international emissions trading system within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol and for
some regional emissions markets. Montero (2009) and Muller et al. (2002) stress that market power issues
are more likely to show up in markets where countries -rather than individual entities- are the relevant
players, as is the case of the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, it can be argued that, even in a cap-andtrade system with a large number of participants (as the EU ETS), it is not unrealistic to assume that
the market is not perfectly competitive since there might be information asymmetries, collusive behavior,
interaction with other markets and other imperfections. For example, Karl-Martin et al. (2008) claim that
"loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets"
(p. 347). Speciﬁcally, they state that "permits might be diverted from their intended use as a vehicle
for tacit collusion in two basically diﬀerent manners: by increasing permit prices or by coordinating the
ﬁrms’ emissions" (p. 357-358). Hinterman (2011) focuses on the power sector and considers a case in
which there is market power in both the power and the permit market. In an application to the EU ETS,
he concludes that the largest electricity producers in Germany, the UK and the Nordpool market could
have found it proﬁtable to manipulate the permit price upwards and he claims that this could explain the
elevated allowance price level during the ﬁrst 18 months of the EU ETS. For each individual market, the
higher or lower severity of those failures will determine how imperfect the market is and, therefore, the
room for eﬃciency improvements.
Apart from market power, we consider an additional element to make the comparison between grandfathering and auctioning non-trivial, which is incomplete information. If information were complete, and

3
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 851 [2013]

more speciﬁcally, if the environmental planner could observe or make a perfect forecast of ﬁrms’ behaviour, then, he could compute the cost-eﬀective solution and implement it.2 Under those conditions there
would be no room for further improvements since grandfathering would readily provide the minimum-cost
allocation. That is clearly not the case in real life. For example, Ellerman et al. (2010) claim that,
during the ﬁrst period of the EU ETS, "the task of setting a cap that was at or close to business-as-usual
(BAU) emissions was made enormously more diﬃcult by poor data. The problem was that no member
state government had a good idea of the exact emissions within the ETS sectors ... and the data problem
was even worse in the new member states of the eastern Europe". Moreover, "the problems created by
poor data were not limited to cap-setting; they extended into the allocation of allowances to installations,
which required installation-level emissions data ... Not surprisingly, since allocations to these installations
depended on the data submitted, industrial ﬁrms were forthcoming, although there has always been a suspicion that the intended use of the data imparted an upward bias to these data" (p. 37-38). We capture
this reality by means of a Bayesian model in which ﬁrms have private information about their technology
and the eﬀects of external events on their BAU emissions.
To the best of our knowledge, the question of how cost-eﬀective an auction is as compared to grandfathering (under market power) has not been addressed in formal terms, although some related informal
discussions and experimental studies have been conducted (see Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994), Godby
(1999, 2000), Muller et al. (2002)). In a theoretical paper, Antelo and Bru (2009) compare auctioning
and grandfathering in a permit market with a dominant ﬁrm, when the government is concerned both
about cost-eﬀectiveness and public revenue, but one of our main building blocks, incomplete information,
is absent in their work. Montero (2009) also uses a deterministic approach and, as a consequence, both
Antelo and Bru (2009) and Montero (2009) conclude that, in a setting in which the auction is followed
by a secondary market, it is optimal for the leader not to take part in the auction and acquire all the
permits in the secondary market. The rationale under this somewhat counterintuitive result is that, for
the leader, it is optimal not to bid in order to keep the price low and then buy the permits in the market
at a lower price than the competitive one by acting as a monopsonist. Although we get some related
result, we conclude below that, under incomplete information, it is not necessarily optimal for the leader
to refrain from participating in the auction.
Our paper builds on two strands of literature. The ﬁrst, pioneered by Hahn (1984), focuses on cap-andtrade systems under market power. An overview of this literature can be found in Montero (2009). The
second strand refers to auction theory. This literature typically focuses on the optimal bidding strategies,
on how auctioned goods are allocated to bidders and what revenue the auctioneer can expect to get from
the auction. Speciﬁcally, we are concerned about multi-unit multi-bid auctions, in which more than one
2 That

is, for example, what Antelo and Bru (2009) conclude in a complete-information model.
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unit is being auctioned (multi-unit) and bidders can bid for more than one unit3 (multi-bid). In most
of the literature on multi-unit multi-bid auctions, common-value is assumed, that is, the value of each
auctioned unit is constant both across units and across bidders. Under such assumption eﬃciency is not
a relevant question since any allocation of units across bidders is eﬃcient. In much simpler settings, such
as single-unit auctions, the resulting allocation is also eﬃcient. For a large range of auction formats it is
always the case that the bidder with the highest valuation is the one who gets the unit on sale.
In our model, the common-value assumption fails to hold for two reasons. First, bidders -polluting ﬁrmsat the time of bidding anticipate that there will be some ﬁrm exerting market power in the secondary
market. Moreover, each ﬁrm anticipates his role, either as a price setter or taker. This heterogeneity
across ﬁrms implies that the value attached to permits is not common to them. Moreover, we realistically
assume that marginal abatement cost is not constant, what implies that, for each bidder, the value of one
additional permit is not constant across units either. Thus, eﬃciency of the auction allocation turns out
to be a relevant question in our setting since eﬃciency results that holds true for simpler auctions do not
trivially extend to this setting.4
We present a simple model in which two ﬁrms receive an initial allocation of emission permits (either
by means of grandfathering or auctioning) and then interact in a secondary market5 in which one of the
ﬁrms acts as a leader and the other one as a follower. As is usual in auction theory, we model incomplete
information by assuming that the agents have random and privately observed types. In our framework,
these types determine the relative position of the abatement-cost functions. For technical simplicity some
of the results are derived under uniform distribution and three alternative scenarios. In the ﬁrst one,
the types are mutually independently distributed, whereas in the other two scenarios they are positively
correlated. In the second case the leader is assumed to have ex-ante lower marginal abatement costs than
the follower and the opposite assumption is imposed in the third scenario.
In this setting, we compare auctioning and grandfathering in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness. A rather
natural argument to support the hypothesis that an auction could improve cost-eﬀectiveness with respect
to grandfathering is that the auction could work in such a way as to reduce the chances of the leader to
exert its market power. To check the validity of this argument, we start analyzing a case in which both
the leader and the follower act non-strategically in the auction although they are capable of anticipating
that, in the secondary market, the leader will act strategically and the follower will be a price taker. So,
3 More

precisely, bidders can submit multiple quantity-price pairs, in short, a demand function.
another example, a classical result in single-unit auctions that does not extend to the multi-unit multi-bid case is the
revenue equivalence theorem. See Krishna (2002) for a detailed discussion on this regard. Examples of multi-unit multi-bid
non-common value auctions are presented in de Castro and Riascos (2009) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998). These
papers do not address eﬃciency and they do not justify the value of the units on sale on the basis of a post-auction market
as we do. Nyborg and Strebulaev (2001) present a model to analyze ECB money markets, considering both an auction and
some secondary market. Though, their model is fundamentally diﬀerent to ours, apart from the application, because the
auctioneer participates in the secondary market with selling and buying prices which are ex-ante announced.
5 For the sake of clarity, we will commonly refer to the secondary market (where ﬁrms can trade permits among themselves)
to diﬀerentiate it from the initial allocation, which can be seen as a primary market. This is a slight abuse of terminology
since only auctioning (not grandfathering) can be considered as a market.
4 As
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in this case, the auction has the eﬀect of making the ﬁrms more symmetric in some sense. The rationale
behind this assumption is that the leader’s ability to set the price in the secondary market could be absent
(or, at least, weaker) in the auction, ﬁrst, because the auctioneer has the duty to guarantee that all the
participants in the auction are treated evenly while it is not so in the secondary market, and second,
because the anonymity of the bidders make it more diﬃcult to emit eﬀective price signals.
This ability of the auction to neutralize market power is just a working hypothesis, not an essential
feature of the auction, at least from a theoretical perspective. Thus, for the sake of completeness, we also
analyze a case in which the auction preserves the roles (leader and follower) assumed in the secondary
market. In standard auction theory,6 the role-preserving auction is a relatively unexplored problem within
a multi-unit multi-bid framework. With respect to the standard approach in the literature, the main
complexities we deal with are non-common value and the existence of a post-auction market. Theoretical
papers on multi-unit multi-bid auctions typically assume common value and no secondary market (see
Wang and Zender (2002) or Alvarez and Mazón (2012)). More general settings, as the one by de Castro
and Riascos (2009) do not fully characterize the equilibrium as we do, but just optimal responses. Since we
are faced with a rather complex and novel model, to tackle it we restrict ourselves to continuous strategies
and a subset of the parameter space that guarantees interior solutions.
Our main results fall into two categories. First, some of the results refer to the existence, uniqueness and
characterization of the equilibrium under the auction. Second, we compare auctioning and grandfathering
in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness. Under the technical requirements we impose, existence and uniqueness is
always guaranteed. As another general result, in all the cases that we study, the auction equilibrium is never
cost-eﬀective, because the leader will either over-bid or under-bid to place him in the most advantageous
position for the secondary market.
In the auction with non-strategic bidders, we conclude that, it the ﬁrms are asymmetric enough in terms
of marginal abatement costs, the ﬁrm with the higher cost is prone to bid more aggressively and get all the
permits in the auction, what tends to generate more cost-eﬀective results than grandfathering. If the ﬁrms
are similar enough to each other, permits are shared among both ﬁrms in the auction, but the follower is
generally under-assigned and the leader is over-assigned with respect to the cost-eﬀective allocation. The
comparison of expected cost is partially carried out with a numerical exploration. The results reveal that,
in the auction, the leader tends to be over-assigned as compared to the cost-eﬀective allocation and, as a
consequence, the auction generally does worse than grandfathering in terms of expected cost when the types
are independently distributed or the leader’s marginal cost is ex-ante lower than the follower’s. Contrarily,
if the follower has access to a more eﬃcient abatement technology, and additionally, the variability of the
types is large in terms of the cap, then it is the auction that outperforms grandfathering, since the allocation
6 By

this, we refer to the game-theoretic approach that characterizes auctions as Bayesian games of incomplete information.
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generated by the auction is closer to the cost-eﬀective one than that resulting from grandfathering.
The role-preserving auction delivers bad news for auctioning. If the auction preserves the leader and
follower roles, it is always dominated by grandfathering. Moreover, the dominance is not only in terms
of expected cost, as it was under the non-strategic auction, but in a stronger manner: for each possible
realization of the types, the auction leads to larger realized cost than grandfathering, what implies ﬁrstorder stochastic dominance of grandfathering with respect to auctioning. There is even more, we prove
the strong result that the auction is optimal ex-post for the leader, in the sense that the leader can play
in such a way that he enjoys the same proﬁt that he would get if he could observe not only his own type,
but also his rival’s type at the time of bidding. We also conclude that the leader always gets less permits
than what would be cost-eﬀective, which is in the same line as the result in Antelo and Bru (2009) and
Montero (2009) regarding the absence of the leader in the auction, but our result is more general in the
sense that the leader’s allocation is lower than the optimal amount, but not necessarily zero.
As a general policy implication, we conclude that the mere fact of auctioning the permits instead of
allocating them by means of grandfathering is not a panacea, at least in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness. The
speciﬁc design of the auction turns out to be crucial and, speciﬁcally, if the auction inherits the leader and
follower roles from the secondary market, the results are prone to be worse rather than better. If, on the
other hand, the auction is capable of diluting market power, then there are chances that it could render
better results than grandfathering.
We organize our work as follows. In Section 2 we present the main elements of the model, including
the structure of the secondary market and how we model grandfathering. In section 3 we analyze the case
in which the ﬁrms act non-strategically in the auction. Section 4 deals with a role-preserving auction.
Section 5 presents some conclusions and discussion.

2
2.1

The model
Basic setting

There are two polluting ﬁrms, labelled as i ∈ {F, L}, that are subject to a cap-and-trade system. Q̄ emission
permits are issued and distributed between the ﬁrms by some allocation procedure (either auctioning or
grandfathering). The number of permits is assumed to be given and we only care about the distribution
of those permits among ﬁrms. Therefore, for our purposes, Q̄ can be treated as a parameter since it is
not an endogenous variable. Each ﬁrm i receives an initial allocation of permits, denoted as qi0 , with
qL0 + qF 0 = Q̄, and then the permits are traded in a secondary market in which L acts as a leader and F
as a follower.7 Since in real-world examples the number of permits to be assigned is typically very large,
7 For easiness of exposition, we consider only two ﬁrms. While including more than one leader would imply a qualitative
complication, the model would be qualitatively similar with a competitive fringe instead of a single follower, since the leader
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as a reasonable approximation we take it to be continuous variable.8
To meet the environmental legal requirements, each ﬁrm has two options: ﬁrst, to use permits and,
second, to do some abatement eﬀort to reduce its emissions. For the sake of analytical tractability, we
assume that the cost of the latter option is given by a quadratic total abatement cost function (T C), that
gives rise to a linear marginal abatement cost (M C):

T Ci (ei ) = Ki − αi ei +

β 2
e ,
2 i

(1)

MCi (ei ) = −T Ci′ = αi − βei ,
where ei represents the eﬀective emissions of ﬁrm i. In this standard speciﬁcation, apart from a ﬁxed-cost
term K, total and marginal costs depend on two parameters, α and β, that represent the intercept and
the slope of MC respectively. We allow for heterogeneity across ﬁrms by making the ﬁxed cost and the
intercept ﬁrm-speciﬁc. An alternative way to do the same would be to make the slope ﬁrm-speciﬁc instead
(or, of course, make all three parameters ﬁrm-speciﬁc). The insight we get is similar but the calculus
become much more cumbersome when β is not constant across ﬁrms.
Moreover, to account for incomplete information, we assume that αi is a random variable that, as is
usual in auction theory, we refer to as the type of ﬁrm i.9 We assume that the distribution of both types
is common knowledge. At the beginning of the game each ﬁrm observes its own type but only knows the
distribution of the rival’s type. In our framework, the interpretation of this assumption is that a ﬁrm itself
is the one that has more accurate information about its own technology and the eﬀect of random shocks
(due to climatic, environmental or technological reasons) on the ﬁrm’s results. We assume that both αL
and αF are a priori distributed in the closed interval [θ, θ + σ], where θ, σ > 0. Thus, the distribution
is characterized by two parameters, θ and σ; the former captures the size whereas the later accounts for
variability in the types.
We assume that, without the cap-and-trade system, the ﬁrms would emit the laissez-faire or BAU emissions, eBAU
, i.e., the amount of emissions that would minimize T Ci . By making the marginal abatement
i
cost equal to zero, we get eBAU
=
i

αi
β .

After the initial allocation is made, the types are publicly revealed. Then the ﬁrms engage in the
secondary market and trade allowances with full information. To assume that the types are known in the
secondary market but not in the auction amounts to the fact that transactions in the secondary market
are far more frequent than auctions, and thus, it is realistic to assume that in the secondary market the
is only concerned about the aggregate behaviour of the followers.
8 See Wilson (1979) or, more recently, Alvarez and Mazon (2012) and Wang and Zender (2002).
9 Following standard auction theory, the auction will be modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The pair
of types, (αF , αL ), are the fundamental random variables of the model ("types"). With a slight abuse of notation, we denote
indistinctly a random variable and an arbitrary realization of it.
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agents handle more information. So, the timing of the game is the following:
1. Each player i observes his own type (realization of αi )
2. The planner initially allocates the permits. We consider two cases:
Option A: Grandfathering
 (for free based on BAU emissions)


2.B.1. Each player submits a bid



Option B: Auctioning
2.B.2. Planner collects bids and sets opt-out price




 2.B.3. Bidders pay the price and get the permits
3. The types are revealed
 to everyone

 4.1. The leader sets the price



4. Secondary market
4.2. The follower decides its demand




 4.3. The market clears

CE
For the sake of comparison, we compute the cost-eﬀective allocation eCE
, which follows from
L , eF

equating marginal abatement costs across ﬁrms and imposing the market-clearing condition eL + eF = Q̄:

eCE
L =

αL −αF +β Q̄
,
2β

eCE
F =

αF −αL +β Q̄
,
2β

(2)

where CE stands for "cost-eﬀective". Note that, when both ﬁrms are identical (αF = αL ), it is optimal
that each ﬁrm gets

2.2

Q̄
2

permits, and if αi > αj it is optimal that ﬁrm i receives more permits than j.

The secondary market

Denote as qi1 the amount of permits that ﬁrm i holds after trading in the secondary market, that has
to coincide with his realized emissions.10 Therefore, the amount of permits sold (if qi0 > qi1 ) or bought
(if qi1 > qi0 ) in the secondary market by ﬁrm i is |qi0 − qi1 |. The aim of both ﬁrms is to maximize their
proﬁts, considering both the revenue or the expenses due to permits trading and abatement costs, i.e.,

Πi = p1 (qi0 − qi1 ) − T Ci ,

(3)

where p1 is the price of permits in the secondary market. The diﬀerence between both ﬁrms’ behavior is that
the follower chooses its net demand while taking p1 as given, whereas the leader takes into account the eﬀect
of his behavior on the market price. We restrict ourselves to interior solutions in the secondary market,
i.e., we require both qL1 and qF 1 to be positive and lower than Q̄ in equilibrium. Besides its tractability,
assuming that the post-market holdings of permits are positive for every ﬁrm is fairly realistic. Moreover,
to avoid meaningless solutions, we require qi1 ≤ eBAU
for all i, i.e., no ﬁrm will hold more permits than
i
their BAU emissions and, hence, some abatement eﬀort is required in equilibrium. Proposition 1 identiﬁes
10 We do not consider the possibility that some ﬁrm buys more permits than needed just to withdraw them from the market
and pushing the price upwards. This is guaranteed under the technical condition (4), that we impose below.
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suﬃcient conditions for these requirements to hold and states the solution to the secondary market under
those conditions.
Proposition 1 If the following condition holds
3
θ ≥ β Q̄ ≥ σ,
2

(4)

the number of permits hold by each ﬁrm in the secondary-market equilibrium is given by
αL − αF
Q̄ + qL0
+
,
3β
3

(5)

αF − αL + β 2Q̄ − qL0
,
3β

(6)

∗
qL1
=

qF∗ 1 =

and it is guaranteed that, for any initial allocation, qi1 ∈ [0, min{Q̄, eBAU
}] holds w.p.1 for i ∈ {F, L}.
i
The resulting proﬁts are given by
β 2
αL + 2αF − 2β Q̄
qL0 + qL0
,
3
6
2αL + 7αF − 2β Q̄
5β 2
πF (qF 0 , α) = ΘF +
qF 0 −
q ,
9
18 F 0
πL (qL0 , α) = ΘL +

(7)
(8)

where α := (αF , αL ) and ΘL and ΘF are two terms that depend on the parameters of the model as well
as the types but are independent of the initial allocation.
In the rest of the paper we restrict ourselves to the parameter space deﬁned by (4). From the results in
Proposition 1, it is important to underline the fact that the equilibrium reached in the secondary market
depends on the initial allocation. Moreover, as ﬁrst noted by Hahn (1984), the only case in which the
secondary market renders the cost-eﬀective solution is that in which the leader initially receives exactly
the amount of permits that corresponds to the cost-eﬀective allocation. If this is the case, the secondary
market is superﬂuous in the sense that no transaction will be made. In any other event, the role of
the secondary market will be relevant. Indeed, using (2) in (5), it is easy to check that, if qL0 < eCE
L ,
then eCE
> qL1 > qL0 . Symmetrically, if qL0 > eCE
then eCE
< qL1 < qL0 . In words, if the leader
L
L
L
receives initially less permits than in the cost-eﬀective allocation, in the secondary market he will act as a
monopsonist and will buy less permits than what would be cost-eﬀective. If, on the contrary, he receives
more permits than eCE
L , he will act as a monopolist and will sell less permits than required to reach
cost-eﬀectiveness.
Summing up, the initial allocation of permits is crucial to determine the equilibrium of the secondary
market and its cost-eﬀectiveness. The secondary market turns out to be relevant as far as the initial allocation is diﬀerent from the cost-eﬀective one. We claim that this is generally the case. Under grandfathering,
10
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if the planner had perfect information (in our framework, if the values of αF and αL were perfectly known),
then it would be possible to compute the cost-minimizing solution and, by allocating the right amount of
permits to each ﬁrm, cost-eﬀectiveness would be achieved with certainty and the secondary market would
be redundant. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that the planner does not have perfect information
about the ﬁrms’ technology and the way in which random shocks aﬀect the ﬁrms’ result. Consistent with
this fact, we assume that the planner allocates the permits under incomplete information, what prevents
him from allocating the cost-eﬀective amount to each ﬁrm. Under auctioning, as it is discussed in the
introduction, in a multi-unit, multi-bid, non-common-value auction as the one we deal with, the resulting
allocation is not necessarily eﬃcient, what in our framework means that it is not cost-eﬀective. This is
consistent with our ﬁndings below.
For the analysis of the auction it is also important to notice that, according to Proposition 1, π L is
strictly convex in qL0 while π F is strictly concave in qF 0 .
In Corollary 1 we show that total cost can be expressed as a function of the amount of permits initially
assigned to the follower.
Corollary 1 The aggregated abatement cost can be written as the following quadratic function of qF 0 :

T C (qF 0 , α) := T CL + T CF = Θ +

αL − αF − β Q̄
β
qF 0 + qF2 0 ,
9
9

(9)

where Θ is a term that depends on the parameters and the types but not on the initial allocation.
We include α as an argument of T C in (9) in order to emphasize its dependence on the types. Since we
focus on cost-eﬀectiveness, T C will be our comparison criterion to assess grandfathering and auctioning as
alternative allocation mechanisms. From (9) it can be noticed that calculating expected total cost under
grandfathering is rather simple since qF 0 is exogenously given (decided by the planner) and, therefore, αL
and αF are the only stochastic variables, while the computation is much more complex under auctioning,
since qF 0 comes out as an equilibrium result determined by the ﬁrms’ strategies, which, in turn, are driven
by the realized types.
An implication of Corollary 1 is that the total cost entailed by an allocation system can be assessed
just by checking how close the initial allocation is to the cost-eﬀective one. In the special case αL = αF it
is immediate to conclude, once again, that the cost-minimizing distribution involves qL0 = qF 0 =

Q̄
2.

Using

(9) allows us to skip computing the secondary-market eﬀect to evaluate an allocation system, since such
eﬀect is already incorporated in (9). We only need to care about the initial allocation. In other words,
all the information we need about the secondary market is contained in (7), (8) and (9).11 For notational
11 As a matter of fact, to evaluate grandfathering we only need (9) since the initial allocation is exogenously given. For the
auction, we also need the proﬁt functions, (7) and (8) to derive the optimal bidding functions.
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simplicity we deﬁne the following monotone linear transformation of T C:

h(δ, α) :=

9
[T C (qF 0 , α) − Θ] = δ 2 β Q̄ + (αL − αF − β Q̄)δ,
Q̄

(10)

which is a function of δ := qF 0 /Q̄, that is, the proportion of permits initially assigned to F . For simplicity,
and with a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to h as "cost", though it actually is a monotone linear
transformation of it. This is innocuous since we are using costs only to determine the relative position
of auctioning and grandfathering, i.e., to ascertain which method is more cost-eﬀective, and the relative
position is not altered by a monotone transformation.12

2.3

Grandfathering

We assume that, under grandfathering, permits are allocated based on BAU emissions, eBAU
=
i

αi
β ,

and it is

important to note that, since αi is a random variable, so are the BAU emissions. In practice, grandfathering
is usually applied by allocating permits based on observed past emissions. Our claim is that the observed
emissions in a given period are the result of ﬁrms’ decisions in that speciﬁc period while using all the
private information they had, including their abatement technologies and the eﬀects of random shocks. In
terms of our model, under grandfathering the planner would use a speciﬁc past observed realization of

αi
β .

But, in general, this past value will not coincide with the present BAU emissions since those emissions
depend on random events and privately observed information. In other words, the planner cannot perfectly
determine the BAU emissions and will use some proxy for it. We assume that the allocation is based on
average historical emissions or, equivalently, on the best prediction of eBAU
, which is its expected value,
i
=
E eBAU
i

E{αi } 13
β .

Therefore, each ﬁrm i receives an initial endowment of permits given by a fraction

of Q̄ proportional to E eBAU
. Speciﬁcally, the follower receives qFG0 = δ G Q̄ and the leader receives
i
G
qL0
= 1 − δ G Q̄, where G stands for grandfathering and

δ G :=

E {αF }
.
E {αL } + E {αF }

(11)

As a particularly simple case, consider that E {αL } = E {αF }, which implies δ G = 21 . Using (10) and
12 Note that h (δ, α) is proportional to the diﬀerence between T C and Θ. From (9) we can interpret Θ as the total cost
associated to a situation in which the follower receives no permits (qF 0 = 0), which we can take as a comparison benchmark.
So, a positive (negative) value of h means that the realized cost is higher (lower) than that in the benchmark situation.
13 The notion of "expected BAU emission" might seem weird since BAU is commonly used to denote an observed value. To
put it in simple terms, assume that the planer introduces a cap-and-trade system in period t and allocates permits based on
past emissions, say ei (t − 1). Since the cap-and-trade system was not in place in period t, this observed value can be seen as
the BAU emissions in t − 1. But the BAU emissions in t need not be equal to ei (t − 1) due to uncertainty, and such value is
unknown at the time of allocating the permits for period t. Our approach is that taking past values can be seen as a prediction
for eBAU
(t) and the most natural value for that prediction is the expected value. An additional empirical argument to take
i
BAU emission as random is that data about past emissions are not always readily available. See the Ellerman et al. (2010)
quotation in the introduction.
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taking expected values, we get total cost under grandfathering and its (unconditional) expected value:

h(δ G , α) =

3

2(αL −αF )−β Q̄
,
4

E{h(δ G , α)} = − β4Q̄ .

(12)

Auction with non-strategic bidders

Assume now that the permits are auctioned. In the secondary market we have assumed the existence of
one leader and one follower. Auction theory in itself does not impose any behavioural assumption in this
regard. In other words, there is nothing in the mere concept of auction that prevents us to keep or to
change those roles in the auction.14 Our analysis tries to account for this generality. In this section we
assume that both L and F act non-strategically in the auction (i.e., both act as price-takers). We start
with this case since it seems the more favourable scenario for the auction. In Section 4 we consider the case
in which the auction is role-preserving, i.e., it keeps the roles assumed in the secondary market. The aim
of this paper is not to discuss which of these assumptions is more realistic, but to illustrate the theoretical
predictions generated by each of them.
Since there are multiple units to be auctioned and every bidder can request more than one unit, we
are faced with a multi-unit multi-bid auction. Moreover, due to the asymmetry between ﬁrms, and to the
fact that M Ci is not constant, it is a non-common value auction. As usual in auction theory, a strategy
for ﬁrm i is a mapping from the support of ﬁrm i’s type into the set of feasible bids. Speciﬁcally, in our
model, a strategy for ﬁrm i is a demand function of the form qib (αi , p0 ), where the required amount, qib ,
depends on the price, p0 , and ﬁrm i’s type, but not on the rival’s type, and b stands for "bid". Since the
total amount of auctioned permits is Q̄, we further assume that the demanded quantity submitted by the
bidders must lie in [0, Q̄], that is, ﬁrms are not individually allowed to submit a demanded quantity either
negative or larger than Q̄ at any price. Denote as vi (qi0 , αi ) := E{π i (qi0 , α) | αi , qi0 } the value function
of ﬁrm i at the auction, i.e., the expected value that i assigns to get qi0 permits in the auction conditional
on his own type, where πi is given by (7) or (8).15 Then, i’s best strategy is deﬁned as
qib∗ (αi , p0 ) = arg max {vi (qi0 , αi ) − p0 qi0 },
qio ∈[0,Q̄]

(13)

i.e., for each ﬁrm, the optimal bid is the demand function that maximizes his value function net of the cost
incurred to get qi0 permits in the auction. An equilibrium in the auction is a pair of best strategies, qFb∗ ,
14 In fact, many -and very important- real life auctions, such as Treasury auctions, do have both price-taker and price-setter
players acting simultaneously.
15 From the value function it is particularly easy to notice that the auction we are faced with is non-common-value. A
common-value auction would require vi (qio , p0 ) = f (α) qi0 , where f (α) is an arbitrary function of the types that is common
for both bidders, i.e., the marginal valuation of permits should be constant across units and across players. Using the
deﬁnition of vi (qio , p0 ) and inspecting (7) and (8), it is obvious that this is not the case in our model.
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b∗
b∗
qL
, and a stop-out price p∗0 that satisﬁes p∗0 = max{p0 | qFb∗ (αF , p0 ) + qL
(αL , p0 ) ≥ Q} for all (αF , αL ).

In words, this latter condition says that there is no a higher price than p∗0 such that all the permits are
awarded while both ﬁrms follow their best strategies. The latter inequality allows for excess demand at the
stop-out price, (which, as we show below, occurs at some equilibria). If so, a standard pro-rata formula is
used, i.e., each player i receives a proportion

qib
qib +qjb

of the permits. Based on the observed features of real

auctions of permits we assume a uniform auction format, what means that all the awarded units pay the
stop-out price, p∗0 .16 Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal bidding functions and the types of equilibria.
Proposition 2 There exist three threshold values pF u , pF d and pL , where pF u > pF d , such that the
optimal bidding functions of F and L are given, respectively, by17

qFb∗ (αF , p0 )

=




0




2E{αL |αF }+7αF −2β Q̄−9p0
5β





 Q̄


 0 if
p0 ≥ pL
b∗
qL (αL , p0 ) =

 Q̄ otherwise.

if

p0 ≥ pF u ,

if

pF d < p0 < pF u ,

(14)

otherwise,
(15)

Additionally, the auction has a unique equilibrium that belongs to one of the following three types:
type 1:

b∗
qL
(αL , p∗0 ) = 0 and qFb∗ (αF , p∗0 ) = Q̄, with p∗0 = pF d ;

type 2:

b∗
qL
(αL , p∗0 ) = Q̄ and qFb∗ (αF , p∗0 ) = 0, with p∗0 = pL ;

type 3:

b∗
qL
(αL , p∗0 ) = Q̄ and qFb∗ (αF , p∗0 ) ∈ 0, Q̄ , with p∗0 = pL .

Moreover, type-1 equilibrium occurs iﬀ ξ < −1, type-2 equilibrium occurs iﬀ ξ > 1 and type-3 equilibrium
occurs iﬀ −1 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, where

ξ :=

6αL − 14αF + 12E{αF | αL } − 4E{αL | αF }
.
5β Q̄

Regarding the follower’s bidding function, in the interior-solution range qFb∗ is decreasing in the price,
as expected. Moreover, it is increasing both in αF and the expected value of αL . Since αF shifts the
follower’s abatement cost, it is reasonable that the higher αF the more F is willing to pay for the permits.
Regarding αL , although this parameter aﬀects L’s, and not F ’s cost, the follower forecasts that a higher
value of αL will make the permits more valuable in the secondary market, what would make him also more
willing to pay in the auction. Finally, qFb∗ depends negatively on the total amount of issued permits, Q̄,
since the more permits are issued the easier it will be to get cheaper permits in the secondary market.
16 An alternative common format is the discriminatory auction, in which every awarded unit pays its bid. See, e.g., chapter
12 of Krishna (2002) for a detailed explanation.
17 We omit the arguments of the bidding functions when there is no ambiguity.
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As for the leader’s strategy, since vL is strictly convex in qL0 , its problem only has corner solutions: L
will demand all the permits if the price is high enough and none in the opposite case. The interpretation
of this result is that it is optimal for the leader to position himself in the best possible situation to exert its
market power in the secondary market (by acting either as a monopolist of a monopsonist). As discussed
above, such market power cannot be exerted when the initial allocation is the cost-eﬀective one. Therefore,
the leader is interested in placing himself as far as possible from the cost-eﬀective allocation. This can be
done either by demanding too few or too many permits. It is optimal to do the former if the price is high
enough and to do the latter if the price is low enough.
These bidding functions give rise to three types of equilibria. In a type-1 equilibrium, F demands Q̄
and L demands nothing, so F receives all Q̄ permits, i.e., δ A = 1, where A stands for "auction". Type-2
equilibrium is just the opposite case; F demands zero, L demands Q̄ and, therefore, δ G = 0. Finally,
in type-3 equilibria the leader demands Q̄ and the follower demands a positive quantity. The third case
implies that there is an excess demand and rationing is required, with δ A ∈ 0, 21 .
Note that type-1 equilibrium resembles Antelo and Bru’s (2009) Proposition 1, which states that, in a
complete-information model, for the leader it is always optimal to bid zero in the auction. We show that,
under incomplete information, this is a possible result, but there are more possibilities depending on the
parameter conﬁguration. In fact, it could even be just the opposite if a type-2 equilibrium holds. Note,
however, that our results in Proposition 2 are not fully comparable to Antelo and Bru’s since they consider
that the leader acts strategically in the auction, as we do in Section 4.
To get some additional insight into the properties of the equilibrium, from now on, we assume that the
conditional expectation of the rival’s type conditional on the own type is a linear function, denoting its
coeﬃcients as follows:
E{αi | αj } = µj + λj αj ,

(16)

where {i, j} is an arbitrary enumeration of {L, F }. Moreover, we assume that αL and αF are jointly
uniformly distributed on a support that satisﬁes (16), as stated in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 Consider the αF αL plane. The support of the pair (αF , αL ) is a square whose lower-left
and upper-right corners are (θ, θ) and (θ + σ, θ + σ) respectively. Within that square, we consider three
diﬀerent probability distributions for (αF , αL ):
• Case 1 ("Independent types"): uniform on the whole square. In this case we have

µL = µF = θ +

σ
,
2

λF = λL = 0.

(17)

• Case 2 ("L-ex ante eﬃcient"): uniform on the lower diagonal triangle, that is, uniform on all points
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satisfying αL ≤ αF . Therefore,
θ
µF = ,
2

µL =

θ+σ
,
2

1
λF = λ L = .
2

(18)

• Case 3 ("F -ex ante eﬃcient"): uniform on the upper diagonal triangle, that is, uniform on all points
satisfying αF ≤ αL . Thus,

µF =

θ+σ
,
2

θ
µL = ,
2

1
λF = .
2

(19)

In case 1 we assume that the types are independently distributed whereas, in cases 2 and 3 the types
are positively correlated. In case 2 we say that L is ex-ante (more) eﬃcient (than F ) in the sense that the
abatement cost function of L is below that of F with probability one (w.p.1). In case 3 αF ≤ αL holds
w.p.1 and we say that F is ex-ante eﬃcient.18 Below we analyze each of these cases separately.

3.1

Independent types (case 1)

We analyze now the likelihood of the three types of equilibria and the comparison of those equilibria with
grandfathering when the types are independently distributed as stated in the ﬁrst case of Assumption
1. We still restrict ourselves to the case in which the secondary market equilibrium is interior and both
ﬁrms exert a positive abatement eﬀort, that is, we assume that (4) holds. The following notation is used
below. Consider the support of the pair (αF , αL ). Let us deﬁne the diagonal of the support as the set
D := {(αF , αL ) / αF = αL = θ + aσ, a ∈ [0, 1]}. In words, the diagonal is the set of realizations of the
types such that both ﬁrms’ costs functions are identical. Additionally, let κ :=

β Q̄
σ .

Notice that κ is a

ratio that depends positively on a measure of the market size given by the total amount of permits (Q̄)
weighted by the impact of each permit in the marginal abatement cost (β) and it depends negatively on
the variability of the types (σ). Note also that (4) implies κ ≥ 1. Denote as Ωl the range of the types
under which a type-l equilibrium takes place, being l ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proposition 3 Assume that both ﬁrms act non-strategically in the auction, the ﬁrms types are mutually
independent and (4) holds. Then in D there are only type-3 equilibria. Moreover, the probabilities of type-1
18 The implication of α ≥ α is that the marginal abatement cost function of ﬁrm i is higher than that of ﬁrm j, i.e.,
i
j
MCi (e) ≥ MCj (e) for any given value of e. To ﬁx ideas, we mostly stick to one possible interpretation of this condition,
namely, that ﬁrm i has access to a more eﬃcient abatement technology than j does. This is not the only interpretation,
though. For example, ﬁrm i’s MC function could be higher simply for a matter of size: it produces more output and, hence,
it is harder for him to cut down emissions. Since we are not dealing with the output market, but only with emissions, the
former interpretation ﬁts more naturally in our setting, but the latter is also possible.
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and type-2 equilibria are the same and given by

Pr(Ω1 ) = Pr(Ω2 ) =





25
42

1−




κ 2
2

0

if κ < 2

(20)

otherwise.

Moreover, conditional on Ω1 and Ω2 , the auction entails lower expected costs than grandfathering, i.e.,
E{h(δ A , α) | Ω1 } < E{h(δ G , α) | Ω1 },

E{h(δ A , α) | Ω2 } < E{h(δ G , α) | Ω1 }

According to Proposition 3 there is always a positive probability of a type-3 equilibrium to arise, which
can be computed as Pr(Ω3 ) = 1 − 2 Pr(Ω1 ). Moreover, if κ ≥ 2 holds, P r(Ω3 ) = 1. If, on the contrary,
κ < 2, all three types of equilibrium can arise with positive probability, although that type-3 equilibrium
is always the most likely one. Indeed, by taking in (20) κ = 1, which is the lowest value consistent with
(4), we get P r(Ω3 ) > 0.7. Figure 1 shows which equilibrium arises for every pair in the support of types
whenever κ < 2, i.e., when all three types of equilibria are possible.
Proposition 3 also states that the auction outperforms grandfathering, on average, in the range where
type-1 and type-2 equilibria arise. To understand this result, it is important to notice that, although δ G
does no depend on the realization of the types (speciﬁcally, in case 1, δ G =

1
2 ),

to make a meaningful

comparison between grandfathering and auctioning under type-1 or type-2 equilibria, we need to evaluate
the expected value of h δ G , α

conditional on the set of realizations of α such that each equilibrium

takes place. As illustrated in Figure 1, a type-1 (resp. type-2) equilibrium tends to arise when αF is
well above αL (αL is well above αF ). In this case, F ’s (L’s) marginal cost of abatement is higher enough
than L’s (F ’s) and, therefore, a situation in which F (L) holds all the permits is prone to be closer to the
cost-eﬀective allocation than a situation in which both ﬁrms receives

Q̄
2.

By direct comparison between the possible allocations resulting from the auction and the cost-eﬀective
one given in (2), it is obvious that, under a type-1 equilibrium, the leader will receive less permits in the
auction than it is cost-eﬀective (and, therefore, will act as a monopsonist in the secondary market) w.p.1
and, under a type-2 equilibrium, he will receive more permits than what is cost-eﬀective (and, hence, he
will be a monopolist in the secondary market) w.p.1. Corollary 2 shows that, in the case in which a type-3
equilibrium holds w.p.1 (i.e., κ ≥ 2) the leader becomes over-assigned with respect to the cost-eﬀective
allocation w.p.1 (and, hence, we will act, again, as a monopolist).
Corollary 2 If κ ≥ 2, L gets over-assigned in the auction with respect to his cost-eﬀective allocation of
permits w.p.1.
As discussed above, under type-1 and type-2 equilibria, auctioning is more cost-eﬀective than grandfathering on average. To make a general assessment of auctioning relative to grandfathering, we need
17
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to evaluate costs under all three possible types of equilibria, weighted by their respective probabilities.
Unfortunately, under type-3 equilibrium no general analytical statements can be made due to the complex
analytical form of expected cost.19 So, we now proceed with some numerical analysis.
We evaluate total abatement costs under auctioning and grandfathering for each combination of parameter values, (θ, β Q̄, σ).20 For each parameter combination we generate 1,000 random realizations of the
pair of types21 . For each realization we compute the corresponding equilibrium at the auction and the
associated realized costs under auctioning and grandfathering. We check, ﬁrst, how diﬀerent realizations
of the types determine the relative cost of both allocation methods. Then, we average across realization
to have an estimation of the expected cost of each system.
We explore exhaustively the parameter space deﬁned by (4). A ﬁrst result is that variations in θ are
irrelevant for the cost comparison as far as it is large enough to ensure that the set deﬁned by (4) is nonempty. The reason is that modifying the value of θ is a change of origin that aﬀects equally both ﬁrms’
marginal costs but not the diﬀerence between them. Once the value of θ is ﬁxed, the set of parameter
values consistent with (4) is bounded, which easies the exploration. So, we just present the results for a
speciﬁc value, θ = 10, and we explore a grid of values of the pair (β Q̄, σ) such that (4) is respected.
Figure 2 shows an illustration of the relative performance of auctioning and grandfathering in terms
of cost for diﬀerent realizations of the pair of types, given a speciﬁc combination of the parameters. The
upper (resp. lower) panel displays the combinations such that auctioning renders lower (higher) cost than
grandfathering. The main conclusion is that those cases in which the diﬀerence between the marginal
cost of both ﬁrms is large enough tend to favour auctioning while, if the ﬁrms’ marginal costs are similar
enough, grandfathering is less costly than the auction. Moreover, when it is the leader’s marginal cost
which is above the follower’s (αL > αF ) the range under which auctioning beats grandfathering is larger
than in the opposite case (αF > αL ).
From these results we can get two insights. First, auctioning is preferable when the ﬁrms are asymmetric
enough in terms of costs. To understand this result, it is useful to identify two eﬀects that we can label
as "information eﬀect" and "market power eﬀect". Regarding the former, note that by means of the bids,
the auction incorporates more information on the realized types (that are privately observed), whereas
grandfathering only uses average values. This eﬀect is prone to favour the auction. As for the latter eﬀect,
bidding gives the leader the opportunity to distort the market equilibrium to some extent, to its own
beneﬁt, what is prone to put the auction at a disadvantage. When the types are very close to each other,
19 The main technical diﬃculty arises from the fact, under a type-3 equilibrium, there is rationing and therefore, the permits
are distributed according to the relative demand of both players, which is a ratio involving stochastic variables (αL , αF ) in
the denominator.
20 Recall that, although Q̄ is not properly a parameter, we treat it as such since it is exogenously ﬁxed. Nevertheless, in
terms of cost, only the product β Q̄ turns out to be relevant, rather than β and Q̄ separately.
21 The number of realizations is chosen to have a sample that is relatively dense in the support of types. We have tried
with diﬀerent sample sizes and the results remain basically unchanged.
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the cost-eﬀective allocation involves allocating similar amounts of permits to both ﬁrms (in the limit, if
αL = αF , the optimal allocation requires δ = 12 ) and, so, grandfathering is prone to generate an allocation
that is very close to the ﬁrst best (recall that grandfathering renders a constant value δ G = 12 ). In this
case, the lack of information on the realized types is not a big problem because the average is a good
enough proxy and then the market power eﬀect dominates. The opposite happens when the marginal costs
are very diﬀerent from each other. In this case, the average is a poor proxy for the realized values and it
is likely that the auction performs better than grandfathering, because the potential gain of using more
precise information can be higher than the loss due to the market power distortion.
The second insight is that the chances for the auction to render a good result in terms of costs are better
when the ﬁrm with the lower marginal abatement costs is not the same that acts as a leader. The intuition
of this result is that, if L enjoys a cost advantage, this would reinforce his leadership, what be would use
to bias the market result for his own proﬁt and this distortion would weaken the beneﬁcial information
eﬀect. The situation is more balanced when the follower can counterbalance its disadvantageous position
by having lower costs than the leader.
Then we move on to compare expected costs, computed as the average across realizations. Our numerical analysis reveals that, for all the parameter values satisfying (4), grandfathering outperforms the
auction in expected terms. Since Proposition 3 states that, in type-1 and type-2 equilibria auctioning outperforms grandfathering, it has to be case, ﬁrst, that grandfathering outperforms auctioning on average
in type-3 equilibria, what is conﬁrmed by our numerical results. Moreover, recall that the probability of
type-1 and type-2 equilibria is always smaller than that of a type-3 equilibrium. As we have discussed in
subsection 2.2, the fact that auctioning entails higher cost than grandfathering means that on average,
the former renders allocations that are further away from the cost-eﬀective distribution than the latter.
This fact is illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts those distances for each realization of the pair of types,
under the same combination of parameter values considered in Figure 2. In this example, the vast majority
of the equilibria are type-3, and the basic message of that ﬁgure is to conﬁrm the theoretical result (see
Corollary 2) that, in the auction, L gets over-assigned (or, equivalently, F under-assigned) with respect to
the cost-eﬀective allocation whenever a type-3 equilibria occurs.
In terms of sensitivity analysis, the diﬀerence between auction and grandfathering increases with κ.
In short, a small variability of the types (as measured by σ in terms of the market size) with respect
to the amount of permits tends to favour grandfathering over the auction. The reason is that a small
variability implies that the average will be a good proxy for the actual value of the types and, therefore,
the grandfathering allocation will be very close to the cost-eﬀective one.
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3.2

Non-independent types (cases 2 and 3)

We consider now cases 2 and 3 in Assumption 1. In both of these cases, the types are positively correlated.
This is a reasonable event to consider since it might well be the case that diﬀerent ﬁrms are aﬀected
similarly by external shocks. For example, it is commonly believed that, in the ﬁrst years of the EU
ETS, the cap was too mild in the sense that too many permits where distributed. The evolution of the
energy markets and the weather caused an excess of permits or, in other words, meeting the environmental
requirements turned out to be easier than expected for most facilities. This is not to say that the eﬀect of
these conditioning factors were exactly the same for all the ﬁrms, since there were clear asymmetries among
them, but it seems safe to state that, on average, those eﬀects worked in the same direction. Propositions
4 and 5 contain our main analytical ﬁndings for these cases.
Proposition 4 If both ﬁrms act non-strategically in the auction, (4) holds and αL ≤ αF holds w.p.1 a
type-1 equilibrium occurs with positive probability if and only if κ < 2 and it never happens in the diagonal.
A type-2 equilibrium occurs with positive probability if κ <

6
5

and, moreover, if a type-2 equilibrium does

not occur for some pair (αF , αL ), it does not hold either for any pair (αF , α′L ) with α′L < αL . A type-3
equilibrium always occurs with positive probability.
Proposition 5 If both ﬁrms act non-strategically in the auction, (4) holds and αF ≤ αL holds w.p.1 a type1 equilibrium occurs with positive probability if and only if κ <

6
5

and, moreover, if this type of equilibrium

does not hold for some pair (αF , αL ), it does not hold either for any pair (αF , α′L ) with α′L > αL . A type-2
equilibrium occurs with positive probability if and only if κ < 2, and always outside the diagonal. A type-3
equilibrium always occurs with positive probability.
Consider ﬁrst case 2 (L eﬃcient). The relative position of the realizations of types that leads to the
diﬀerent equilibria are depicted in Figure 4 panel a. The numerical analysis for the case of L eﬃcient
(omitted for the sake of brevity) shows qualitatively identical results to the case with independent types.
Regarding case 3 (F eﬃcient), Figure 4 panel b shows the relative position of the realizations of the
types leading to each possible equilibrium. Next, we perform some numerical analysis for this case. Figure
5 shows that, unlike the two previous cases, there are parameter values for which the expected cost under
auctioning is smaller than under grandfathering. Those points are displayed in green in the graph. The
implication of this result is that, as discussed above, it is favourable for the auction that the agent endowed
with market power is not the one with the lowest, but the highest cost, since any cost advantage would
make him more capable to exploit his market power. Another message we can get from this analysis is that
auctioning tends to do better, as compared to grandfathering, when the variability of types, as measured
by σ, is large enough in terms of β Q̄, which is in line with the analysis done for the independent-types
case.
20
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Figure 6 illustrates a case in which the auction leads to lower expected cost. To ease the comparison
with the case of independent types, we take as an example (σ, β Q̄) = (6, 8) and θ = 10. As in the case with
independent types, L is still over-assigned in the auction with respect to the cost-minimizing allocation
(the red line), but now the allocations resulting from the auction (represented by green dots) are, on
average, closer to being cost-eﬀective than those resulting from grandfathering (the blue line).

4

Role-preserving auction

In this section we analyze another setting for the auction in which the leader acts strategically while the
follower still acts as a price taker. This case is based on the belief that, if one ﬁrm has market power in
the secondary market, due to its size or dominant position, it is likely that this power has a reﬂection in
the auction. To capture this notion, we assume a Stackelberg-like setting in which the follower acts as a
price-taker, whereas the leader is capable of predicting the follower’s strategy and reacting optimally to it.
This section brings up some additional technical complexity. It conveys a strategic bidder in a multi-unit
multi-bid non-common-value auction. To the best of our knowledge, this is in the frontier of multi-unit
auction theory. For the sake of tractability, we restrict ourselves to continuous strategies and interior
solutions, which implies that, in equilibrium, both the leader and the follower requires an amount of
b
permits between 0 and Q̄, in such a way that qFb + qL
= Q̄ and rationing is ruled out. We also keep the

distributional assumptions made above: the conditional expectations are linear and, when needed, we will
also assume a uniform distribution.
Given that F is still non-strategic in the auction, his behavior is the same as in Section 3. So, the
follower’s problem is (13) and his best strategy as deﬁned in (14).22 On the other hand, the leader’s
b∗
best strategy is a bid function qL
(αL , p0 ) that represents a best response to F ’s strategy. To model the
b
leader’s problem, deﬁne total demand in the auction as Φ (α, p0 ) := qL
(αL , p0 ) + qFb (αF , p0 ), from which

the opt-out price can be obtained by imposing the market-clearing condition Φ (α, p∗0 ) = Q̄ and solving
for p∗0 we get p∗0 = Φ−1 α, Q̄ .23 Therefore, the leader’s problem is

arg max vL (qL0 , αL ) − E Φ−1 α, Q̄ × qL0 | αL .

(21)

b (α ,p )
qL
L 0

Notice that, unlike the non-strategic case, L’s best strategy depends on F ’s (through Φ (α, p0 )). Moreover, L does not take the price as given, but he plays by predicting the equilibrium price that will result
from his and F ’s demand. The stop-out price, p∗0 , is again the highest market-clearing price when both
ﬁrms play their corresponding best strategies.
22 Speciﬁcally,
23 For
b
and qL

since we disregard corner solutions in this section, the relevant part of (14) is that involving interior solution.
b
Φ−1 to be a well-deﬁned function we require that Φ is invertible in p0 . This turns out to be case because both qF
b
are decreasing in p0 . (14) reveals that the former is decreasing and Proposition 6 shows that qL also is.
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An important feature of this case is that the leader is capable of making an ex-post optimal bid, i.e., a
bid that gives him the maximum possible proﬁt for any realization of the types, as stated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 6 Under any of the three cases considered in Assumption 1 there exists a non-empty set of
the parameters θ, σ, β Q̄ such that there is a unique equilibrium in which the leader’s best strategy is
b∗
qL
(αL , p0 ) = m0 + m1 Q̄ + m2 αL + m3 p0 ,

(22)

where m0 ≤ 0, m1 ≤ 0, m2 ≥ 0 and m3 ≤ 0 depend only on β and λL . Moreover, the equilibrium price
of the auction for any α = (αL , αF ) is the solution to
max π L Q̄ − qFb (αF , p0 ) , α − p0 × Q̄ − qFb (αF , p0 )
{p0 }

(23)

and the equilibrium of both the auction and the secondary market are interior w.p.1.
To understand this proposition, it is important to notice that (23) is an artiﬁcial auxiliary problem
that selects the best price in the auction for the leader for any given pair (αL , αF ). We say that it is
artiﬁcial because it is written as if L could know the realization of αF . This would be an ideal situation
for the leader since he would not be aﬀected by incomplete information. Proposition 6 states that there
exists a bidding function for the leader such that the equilibrium price of the auction will replicate the
solution to problem (23). It is important to underline that the bidding function depends only on known
information for the leader (αF is absent). This is what Wang and Zender (2002) refer to by saying that
the auction allocation is ex-post optimal for the leader in the sense that the leader can play in such a way
that the ultimate equilibrium will be the one that the leader would choose if he had full information. In
other words, if the leader happened to know the value of αF , he would not change his strategy. Note also
that, although this is a remarkably strong result for the leader, the bidding function used to get that result
is rather standard in the sense that it is a linear function and, as expected, it is linearly decreasing in the
price and the total amount of issued permits and increasing in L’s type.
Proposition 7 shows that, in the conditions described above, the auctioning solution is less cost-eﬀective
than the grandfathering solution w.p.1 what, as stated in Corollary 3, implies ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) of grandfathering over auctioning.
Proposition 7 In cases 1, 2 and 3 described in Assumption 1, under the relevant conditions for interior
solutions, the amount of permits that the leader receives in equilibrium is lower than his cost-eﬀective
allocation and lower than the amount that he would receive under grandfathering; and the clearing price of
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the auction is lower than the price of the secondary market, i.e.,
A
qL0
< eCE
L ,

A
G
qL0
< qL0
,

A
pA
0 < p1 .

Moreover, the total cost of abatement when the permits are auctioned is higher than under grandfathering,
i.e.,
h(δ A , α) > h(δ G , α)

∀α.

Corollary 3 Under the conditions described in Proposition 7, the cumulative probability distribution
(CPD) of T C under the grandfathering allocation ﬁrst-order-stochastically dominates the corresponding
CPD under the auction.
The second part of Proposition 7 is remarkably strong since it states that, in any event, auctioning
will always be beaten by grandfathering from the point of view of cost. It deserves to be stressed that
this is not only true in expected terms, but it is also true for every feasible realization of the types (as far
as interior solution is guaranteed). The main message of this result is that introducing an auction such
that the leader in the secondary market is also so in the auction can only worsen the results in terms of
costs as compared to grandfathering. Moreover, under interior solution, this result holds with certainty.
The reason is that the leader will have strong incentives to use its leadership to distort the market to own
advantage and such distortion will result in a cost increase.
A clear-cut policy implication is that, with imperfect competition in the secondary market, switching
from grandfathering to auctioning is likely to worsen the situation (in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness) if it
cannot be avoided that the market power spills over to the auction. Corollary 3 translate this result in the
standard concept of FOSD.24
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 7 clariﬁes how the auction behaves with respect to the cost-eﬀective
allocation. The leader will always receive less permits from the auction than the cost-eﬀective amount,
eCE
L , and, therefore, will act as a monopsonist in the secondary market. Under grandfathering, the leader
might receive more or less permits than what would be cost-eﬀective, depending on the realizations of
the types (and, if by chance both types were equal to its average, then grandfathering would render the
cost-eﬀective solution) but in the event that it receives less than eCE
L , it would always be closer to the
cost-eﬀective solution than the auctioning solution. The leader understates his demand in the primary
market to keep the price low. When he demands permits in the secondary market, the price increases
to some extent, but it will we always lower than the price that would prevail under perfect competition.
This result can be seen as a generalization of the result that Antelo and Bru (2009) get in a framework of
24 As a matter of fact, the result in Proposition 7 is even stronger than FOSD since the latter does not preclude the
possibility that the cost under auctioning is lower than under grandfathering for some (small enough) range of the parameter
values, what is discarded in Proposition 7.
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perfect information in the sense that, with a dominant ﬁrm and a secondary market, "it is optimal for the
dominant ﬁrm to abstain from the initial auction" (Prop 1, p. 325). Under incomplete information, we get
a softer result in the sense that the leader tends to demand less than socially optimal, but the demanded
amount is no necessarily zero.

5

Conclusions and discussion

This paper compares the two most common allocation mechanisms of emission permits, auctioning and
grandfathering, under two central assumptions: the existence of a secondary market with market power
and the presence of incomplete information. On the one hand, we claim that these two elements together
make the comparison between both methods non-trivial. On the other hand, it is rather realistic to assume
that both elements are present to some extent in important real-life examples such as the Kyoto Protocol
or the EU ETS.
One reason to be interested in this comparison is that there seems to be a current tendency (notably in
the EU ETS) to shift from grandfathering to auctioning. This paper oﬀers some insights into what we can
really expect the auction do in a relatively adverse scenario: market power and incomplete information.
Within a simple model, we study the optimal bidding strategies as well as the equilibria and we characterize
the conditions under which auctioning does better or worse than grandfathering in terms of aggregate
abatement cost.
The chances of auctioning to outperform grandfathering come essentially from the fact that, by means
of the bids, the auction incorporates information that are only privately observable and, hence, could not
be used by the planner to implement a centralized allocation. On the other hand, the risk of the auction
is that a ﬁrm with market power can use such power to distort the equilibrium in its own beneﬁt. The
ﬁnal balance depends on the relative strength of these two forces.
One central conclusion of our analysis is that we cannot expect that an auction "per se" has the
property of providing more cost-eﬀective allocations of permits. Indeed, the design of the auction and,
speciﬁcally, its ability to preserve or dilute market power is a crucial element for the comparison. If the
auction is capable of removing market power, then there is a chance that the results under the auction
will be more cost-eﬀective than under grandfathering. This is more likely to happen when the ﬁrms turn
out to be very asymmetric in terms of cost, especially if the ﬁrm with cost advantage is not the same that
enjoys market power. In this case, the additional information used by the auction tips the scales in its
favour. In expected terms, the chances for the auction to outperform grandfathering increase when the
follower’s costs are well below the leader’s and the variability of the types is large enough in terms of the
number of permits to be distributed. If, on the contrary, the auction reproduces the leader and follower
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roles, one can only expect that this would result in more costly outcomes than grandfathering.
The aim of this paper is to oﬀer some general insights about cap-and trade systems and not about
one speciﬁc market such as the EU ETS (in which, moreover, it is not clear enough that market power
is one of the main issues). Nevertheless, for the sake of motivation, it has been useful for us to take as
a starting point the EC’s argument to support auctioning on the grounds of eﬃciency (although we have
focused on the milder criteria of cost-eﬀectiveness by taking the cap as given). Although our analysis is
strongly focused on cost-eﬀectiveness, it can also provide some clues about the plausibility of the other EC’s
arguments to support auctioning: transparency, simplicity, more incentives for abatement investments and
eliminate windfall proﬁts.
The transparency argument makes sense as far as auctioning automatically incorporates more information than grandfathering since the bids contain privately observed data that typically will not be accessible
to the environmental authorities. Moreover, auctioning has the advantage of treating facilities more evenly
whereas, in the two ﬁrst phases of the EU ETS, grandfathering has been applied through the National
Allocation Plans, which inevitably have introduced some across-countries and across-facilities asymmetries
in the permit allocation.
Regarding simplicity, it is by no means obvious that auctioning is simpler than grandfathering. From
the planner’s point of view, auctioning incorporates a clearer market-based dimension to the allocation
procedure, what frees to some extent the environmental authorities from the responsibility of making direct
allocations. But, on the other hand, it entails some additional complexities in the setup of the system,
such as choosing the design of the auction (e.g., uniform or discriminatory), creating the auction platforms
or deciding about the destiny of the revenues. From the facilities’ point of view, it requires more frequent
interaction between the participants and the authorities and probably some additional training to be able
to bid properly.
Concerning the introduction of incentives for abatement investments, according to our results, this will
be probably more true for ﬁrms without market power, which will typically bear higher costs and, hence,
will have stronger incentives to improve their abatement technologies. Finally, the elimination of windfall
proﬁts is supported, to some extent, by the mere fact that ﬁrms will have to pay for the permits and,
therefore, it is no longer the case that operators charge their customers the cost of allowances they have
received for free. Nevertheless, the fact that allowances are not free of charge does not fully eliminate the
possibility of windfall proﬁts in the form of speculative operations. We conclude that, in most cases, the
allocation resulting from an auction will be further away from the cost-eﬀective one than that resulting
from grandfathering. This implies that the marginal abatement costs will be more diﬀerent across facilities,
hence creating a room for windfall proﬁts. What can probably be argued is that windfall proﬁts will be
smaller on average and concentrated on fewer hands, speciﬁcally in the hands of those ﬁrms that enjoy
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some market power. Summing up, our analysis seems to support the EC’s arguments of transparency and
more incentives for abatement investments, but not those of simplicity and the elimination of windfall
proﬁts. Obviously, these thoughts must be taken as a preliminary and incomplete informal discussion, not
as a fully-ﬂedged analysis, which is left for future work.
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6

Appendix 1: proofs

6.1

Proof of Proposition 1

Assume initially that the solution is interior (what we check below). The optimal behaviour of the follower
is derived by solving problem (3) for i = F while taking p1 as given. From the ﬁrst-order condition (FOC)
we get the follower’s net demand for permits:
qFd 1 (p1 ) =

1
(αF − p1 ) ,
β

(24)

where d stands for "demand". To get the leader’s demand we solve problem (3) for i = L including
as constraints the market clearance condition, qL1 + qF 1 = Q̄ and the follower’s demand, (24). The
(interior) solution to this problem is given by (5). Using the market clearing condition and (24), we get
the equilibrium price in the secondary market,
p∗1 =

αL + 2αF − β 2Q̄ − qL0
,
3

(25)

and using (25) in (24) we get the equilibrium number of permits for the follower, given by (6). Using (5),
(6) and (25) in the expressions for F ’s and G’s proﬁts and rearranging we get (7) and (8) where ΘL and
ΘF include the terms that do not depend on the initial allocation.
To show that the solution satisﬁes qi1 ∈ [0, min{Q̄, eBAU
}] w.p.1, note ﬁrst that 0 ≤ qF 1 ≤ Q̄ ensures
i
0 ≤ qL1 ≤ Q̄ and using (24) we get 0 ≤ qF 1 ≤ Q̄ ⇐⇒ αF ≥ p1 ≥ αF − β Q̄, which using (25) can be
written as − β1 (αL − αF ) + 2Q̄ ≥ qL0 ≥ − β1 (αL − αF ) − Q̄. Since qL0 ∈ [0, Q̄], the previous inequalities
are ensured for any initial allocation iﬀ − β1 (αL − αF ) + 2Q̄ ≥ Q̄ and 0 ≥ − β1 (αL − αF ) − Q̄ hold at the
same time. The intersection of these inequalities is: Q̄ ≥ β1 |αL − αF | and, since the maximum value of the
right-hand side is σ/β, we have
β Q̄ ≥ σ.
Firm i makes a strictly positive abatement eﬀort iﬀ qi1 ≤ eBAU
=
i

(26)
αi
β ,

i.e., αi − βqi1 ≥ 0. If we

particularize this inequality for i = F , using (24), we have p1 ≥ 0 what, using (25), can be written as
αL + 2αF ≥ β(2Q̄ − qL0 ). Since qL0 ∈ [0, Q̄] and the minimum value for each type is θ, the latter equality
is guaranteed under (4). For i = L, using (5), condition αL − βqL1 ≥ 0 can be written as

2αL + αF ≥ β(Q̄ + qL0 ).

(27)

The most adverse values for the fulﬁlment of (27) are αL = αF = θ, qL0 = Q̄. To ensure that (27)
holds w.p.1 we plug those values to get θ ≥ 32 β Q̄, which combined with (26) gives (4).
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6.2

Proof of Corollary 1

Total cost can be computed by plugging (5) and (6) in (1).25 Substituting qL0 by Q̄ − qF 0 and rearranging,
we get (9), where Θ includes the terms that do not depend on the initial allocation.

6.3

Proof of Proposition 2

Using (8), vF (qF 0 , αF ) can be written as

vF (qF 0 , αF ) = E {ΘF | αF } +

5
1
2E{αL | αF } + 7αF − 2β Q̄ qF 0 − βqF2 0 .
9
18

Since vF is strictly concave in qF 0 for every αF , an interior solution to F ’s problem (if it exists) follows
easily from the ﬁrst-order condition, which can be solved to get
qFb = τ F (qF 0 , αF ) :=

2E{αL | αF } + 7αF − 2β Q̄ − 9p0
,
5β

(28)

where, for simplicity of exposition, we have denoted as τ F (qF 0 , αF ) the right-hand side of the previous
equality. Since the submitted demand must lie in [0, Q̄] and given the concavity of vF on qF 0 , it is
qFb = 0 and qFb = Q̄ whenever τ F (p0 , αF ) ≤ 0 and τ F (p0 , αF ) ≥ Q̄, respectively. Notice also that
τ F (p0 , αF ) is strictly decreasing in p0 for every αF , thus pF u and pF d are deﬁned by τ F (pF u , αF ) = 0 and
τ F (pF d , αF ) = Q̄ respectively. Thus, we have

pF u =

2E{αL | αF } + 7αF − 2β Q̄
9

,

pF d =

2E{αL | αF } + 7αF − 7β Q̄
.
9

Now, consider L’s problem, which is maxqL0 {vL (qL0 , αL ) − p0 qL0 } where

vL (qL0 , αL ) = E{πL (qL0 , α) | αL , qL0 } = E (ΘL | αL ) +

αL + 2E{αF | αL } − 2β Q̄
β 2
qL0 + qL0
.
3
6

Clearly vL (qL0 , αL ) is strictly convex in qL0 for every αL , and therefore the leader’s problem only has
b
b
corner solutions, i.e., qL
∈ {0, Q̄} with qL
= Q̄ ⇐⇒ vL Q̄, αL ≥ vL (0, αL ). Given that vL (0, αL ) =

E {ΘL | αL }, L chooses qL0 = Q̄ whenever vL Q̄, αL ≥ E {ΘL | αL } + p0 Q̄ holds. Denote as pL the
vL (Q̄,αL )−E{ΘL |αL }
maximum value of p0 such that this inequality holds, i.e., pL =
. Using the expression
Q̄
for vL we get
pL :=

αL + 2E{αF | αL } 1
− β Q̄.
3
2

(29)

Since the support of αL and αF is [θ, θ + σ], we know pL > θ − 21 β Q̄ > 0, where the latter inequality
follows from (4). Thus, demanded quantity is not smaller than supply at some positive price (pL ), which
25 Alternatively,

using (3) it can be obtained as T C = − (π L + π F ), by noting that qF 0 + qL0 = qF 1 + qL1 = Q̄.
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guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in the auction. Uniqueness follows from the fact that each ﬁrm’s
demand is non-increasing in p0 for every possible pair (αF , αL ). Since pF u > pF d and pL > 0 hold w.p.1,
there are just three possible cases.
• The ﬁrst case is pL < pF d . The stop-out price cannot be p0 > pF d because there would be excess
supply (i.e., some units would not be awarded). Since all the permits would be awarded for any
p0 ≤ pF d , the opt-out price must be pF d , F gets all the permits and L gets nothing. This corresponds
to type-1 equilibrium.
• The second case is pF u < pL . For any p0 > pL there would be excess supply and all the permits
would be awarded for any p0 ≤ pL . Therefore, the opt-out price must be pL and L gets all the
permits, which corresponds to type-2 equilibrium.
• The third case is pF d ≤ pL ≤ pF u , which corresponds to type-3 equilibrium, in which permits are
shared between F and L. The equilibrium price is pL , at which F and L demand τ F (pL , αF ) ∈ 0, Q̄
and Q̄, respectively and rationing is required.
Straightforward algebra leads to pL < pF d ⇐⇒ ξ < −1, pF u < pL ⇐⇒ ξ > 1 and pF d ≤ pL ≤
pF u ⇐⇒ −1 ≤ ξ ≤ 1.

6.4

Proof of Proposition 3

Under independent types, the conditions given in Proposition 2 for type-1 and 2 equilibria collapse to

type 1:
type 2:

5
ξ < 1 ⇔ 3αL − 7αF + 4θ + 2σ + β Q̄ < 0,
2
5
ξ > 1 ⇔ 7αF − 3αL − 4θ − 2σ + β Q̄ < 0.
2

(30)
(31)

respectively. For any pair in D, (30) and (31) become

(2 − 4a)σ + 52 β Q̄ < 0,

(4a − 2)σ + 52 β Q̄ < 0,

none of which, under (4), holds for any admissible a. Thus, we only have type-3 equilibria in D. Notice
that the pair (αF , αL ) = (θ + σ, θ) satisﬁes (30) if κ ≤ 2, which is allowed under (4). In addition, the
equality of (30) is a straight line with positive slope in the plane αF αL , let us denote it by L1 . Thus, in
the support of (αF , αL ), under κ ≤ 2, the subset satisfying (30) is the triangle below L1 , which does not
contain the diagonal (see Figure 1 for illustration). If κ > 2, that subset is empty. An analogous analysis
shows that, under κ ≤ 2, the support region for type-2 equilibrium is the triangle above the line deﬁned
by the equality of (31), this region does not contain the diagonal and is empty if k > 2 (see Figure 1).
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Since the types are assumed uniformly distributed, the probabilities of Ω1 and Ω2 are proportional to
the corresponding areas, which can be easily computed based on Figure 1. For type-1 equilibrium we have
E{h(δ A , α) | Ω1 } = E{h(1, α) | Ω1 } = E{αL − αF | Ω1 } =

1
3

1 31
− − κ σ
3 21

(32)

where the last equality follows directly from the computation of the expected values of αL and αF conditional on Ω1 . In addition, using (12) and κσ = β Q̄, we know that, under grandfathering, the expected
cost is given by E{h(δ G , α) | Ω1 } = E{h(1/2, α) | Ω1 } = 12 E{αL − αF | Ω1 } − 14 κσ.
Therefore, direct comparison of expected costs under A and G leads to
1
E{h(δ A , α) | Ω1 } < E{h(δ G , α) | Ω1 } ⇐⇒ E{αL − αF | Ω1 } < κσ
2
and using the value of E {αL − αF | Ω1 } computed in (32) we get E{h(δ A , α) | Ω1 } ≤ E{h(δ G , α) | Ω1 }
iﬀ κ >

49
62 ,

which holds for the relevant range of κ, i.e., [1, 2].

For type-2 equilibria the expected cost under auctioning is E{h(δ A , α) | Ω2 } = E{h(0, α) | Ω2 } = 0.
Under grandfathering we have E{h(δ G , α) | Ω2 } = E{h(1/2, α) | Ω2 } = 12 E{αL − αF | Ω2 } − 14 κσ. Now,
the corresponding conditional expectation is E{αL − αF | Ω2 } =
G

E{h(δ , α) | Ω2 } =

σ
252

1
3

1
3

+

31
21 κ

σ and, using this value,

(14 − κ). Therefore, for any value of κ compatible with (4) we conclude
E{h(δ G , α) | Ω2 } > 0 = E{h(δ A , α) | Ω2 }.

6.5

Proof of Corollary 2

Our strategy to prove the corollary is to show that, provided that κ ≥ 2 holds, for any arbitrary realization
α := (αF , αL ), we get δ A < δ CE =

αF −αL +β Q̄
,
2β Q̄

where the last equality comes directly from (2).

Under a type-3 equilibrium, the auction allocation is given by δ A :=

τ F (qF 0 ,αF )
,
τ F (qF 0 ,αF )+Q

where τ F (qF 0 , αF )

is deﬁned in (28). Using this expression for δ A we get
δ A < δ CE ⇐⇒ βτ F (qF 0 , αF ) ≤

δ CE
β Q̄.
1 − δ CE

(33)

Now, we evaluate τ F (qF 0 , αF ) in the equilibrium price, p∗0 , that, under a type-3 equilibrium is equal
to pL , where pL is given by (29). Using the expression for δ CE together with (16) and, using (17), (33)
can be written as

δ A < δ CE ⇐⇒

7αF − 3αL − 4θ − 2σ
3(αF − αL ) + βQ
<
βQ.
5
2(βQ + αL − αF )
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Notice that we can write αi = θ + ri σ for i ∈ {F, L}, where ri is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], so that
there is a one-to-one mapping between αi and ri . Additionally, use the deﬁnition of κ to write βQ = κσ.
By doing these substitutions in the latter inequality we get rid of θ and σ to obtain
δ A < δ CE ⇐⇒ 7rF − 3rL − 2 <

3(rF − rL ) + κ 5
× κ.
κ − (rF − rL )
2

(34)

To check that this inequality holds for any pair (αF , αL ) or, equivalently, for any pair (rF , rL ), we
distinguish two cases. Consider ﬁrst rF ≥ rL . Notice that 7rF − 3rL − 2 ≤ 3(rF − rL ) + 2 and that
3(rF − rL ) + κ
3(rF − rL ) + 2
≥
κ − (rF − rL )
κ − (rF − rL )
where we have used κ ≥ 2. Thus, a suﬃcient condition for (34) to hold is

3(rF − rL ) + 2 <

3(rF − rL ) + 2 5
× κ.
κ − (rF − rL )
2

(35)

If rF ≥ rL , the left-hand side of (35) is positive and we can divide both sides by 3(rF − rL ) + 2 and
rearrange to get 32 κ > rL − rF , which trivially holds when κ ≥ 2 and rF ≥ rL .
Consider now rF < rL . Notice that the right-hand side in (34) increases with κ, so it suﬃces to prove
the inequality for κ = 2. Plugging this value of κ and rearranging we get
2
−7rF2 − 3rL
+ rF + 7rL + 10rF rL − 14 < 0.

(36)

A suﬃcient condition for (36) to hold is that both of the following inequalities hold:

rF + 7rL − 8 ≤ 0

(37)

2
−7rF2 − 3rL
+ 10rF rL − 6 < 0

(38)

since, if both (37) and (38) hold, (36) follows from the sum of both of them. Clearly, (37) holds since rF ,
rL ∈ [0, 1]. To prove (38) deﬁne s :=

rF
rL ,

2
where s ∈ [0, 1] and rewrite (38) as (−7s2 − 3 + 10s)rL
− 6 < 0.

For any rL , the expression inside the parenthesis attains its maximum at s = 5/7. For that value of s, the
2
latter inequality becomes 47 rL
− 6 < 0, which clearly holds true for any rL ∈ [0, 1].

6.6

Proof of Proposition 4

As shown in Proposition 2, the condition for a type-1 equilibrium to arise is ξ < −1. Using (16) and (18),
in the diagonal this condition can be written as 5κ ≤ 4a − 6, which clearly does not hold for any admissible
value of a. In addition, the most favourable pair of realizations for a type-1 equilibrium is αF = θ + σ and
32
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αL = θ, under which the condition ξ < 1 becomes κ < 2. Thus, there is a positive probability to get a
type-1 equilibria if and only if this latter inequality holds, and the realizations under which it takes place
are in the lower-right corner of the support of ﬁrms types.
Now consider the condition for type-2 equilibria, ξ > 1. Under realizations in D, and after some
algebra, this condition becomes 5κ ≤ 2(3 − 2a), which is in contradiction with (4) if and only if a > 14 . On
the other hand, for a = 0, which is the most favourable case, the inequality becomes κ < 65 , which is the
required condition for this type of equilibrium to arise with positive probability.
To prove that a type-3 equilibrium always arises with positive probability, we evaluate ξ in (αF , αL ) =
(θ + σ, θ + σ) and using (18) we get ξ =

−2σ
5βQ̄

which clearly belongs to (−1, 1) under (4) and, by continuity,

this is true for some non-empty interval around (θ + σ, θ + σ).

6.7

Proof of Proposition 5

Using (16) and (19) we conclude that the condition for a type-1 equilibrium to occur, ξ < −1, in the
diagonal takes the form κ ≤

2(1+2a)
,
5

which does not contradict (4) iﬀ a ≥

3
4.

So, the most favourable

situation is a = 1, under which the previous inequality becomes κ ≤ 56 . In addition, if ξ < −1 does not
hold for some pair (αF , αL ), it does not hold neither for any pair (αF , α′L ) with α′L > αL . Thus, there
is a positive probability of type 1 equilibria if and only if κ ≤

6
5

holds. Under the latter inequality, the

realizations of the ﬁrms types under which there is a type 1 equilibrium are in the upper-right corner of
the triangle.
The condition for a type-2 equilibrium to arise in the diagonal is 5κ ≤ −2(1 + 2a), which does not
hold for any admissible value of a. In addition, the most favourable realization for a type-2 equilibrium to
occur are αF = θ and αL = θ + σ, under which the inequality becomes κ ≤ 2.
To prove that a type-3 equilibrium always arises with positive probability, we evaluate ξ in (αF , αL ) =
(θ, θ) and using (19) we get ξ =

2σ
5β Q̄

which clearly belongs to (−1, 1) under (4) and, by continuity, this is

true for some non-empty interval around (θ, θ).

6.8

Proof of Proposition 6

Assume initially that the solution is interior (what we check below). The ﬁrst step is to derive the solution
of problem (23). The ﬁrst-order condition (FOC) of this problem is

−

dπ L ∂qFb∗
∂qb∗
·
− Q̄ − qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) + p0 F = 0,
dqL0 ∂p0
∂p0
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where, under interior solution, we know qFb∗ = τ F (qF 0 , αF ) -see (28)-. Using the expressions for πL and
τ F (qF 0 , αF ) and rearranging, FOC can be written as
2
8Q̄ 3 (αL + 2αF )
9
τ F (qF 0 , αF ) −
+
−
p0 = 0.
5
5
5β
5β
Using again the expression for τ F (qF 0 , αF ) and (16) we get
2µF
(2λF + 7) αF
2Q̄
9
3 (αL + 2αF )
9
+
−
−
p0 − 4Q̄ +
−
p0 = 0
5β
5β
5
5β
2β
2β
which, solving for p0 and simplifying, provides the solution of (23):

p∗0 =

4µF
2 (2λF + 22) αF
15αL 44
+
+
− β Q̄.
63
63
63
63

(39)

Assume now the leader’s strategy is linear (we argue below that this is necessarily the case) and takes
b∗
the form qL
(p0 , αL ) = m0 + m1 Q̄ + m2 αL + m3 p0 . The second step is to show that there exist values of
b∗
the coeﬃcients m0 , m1 , m2 , m3 such that the market clearing condition qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) + qL
(p0 , αL ) = Q̄ has
b∗
p∗0 as a solution. This means that, when L and F bid qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) and qL
(p0 , αL ) respectively, p∗0 arises
b∗
as a clearing price for the auction. Using the expressions for qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) and qL
(p0 , αL ) in the market

clearing condition, substituting (39) for p0 and collecting terms, we get the following equation:
µL (4βm3 + 18)
18λL + βm3 (5λL + 44) + 9
β (7m2 + m3 ) − 3
63m1 − 44βm3 + 54
+m0 +
αF +
αL +
Q̄ = Q̄.
63β
63β
7β
63
For this equation to hold for any arbitrary pair (αL , αF ), we need that the, in the left-hand side, the
constant term and the coeﬃcients associated to αF and αF are equal to zero and the coeﬃcient associated
to Q̄ is equal to one. From those conditions we get a system of four equations which has, as a unique
solution, m0 =

−3λL
β(λL +11)

≤ 0, m1 =

−3λL
λL +11

≤ 0, m2 =

6λL +21
4β(λL +11)

≥ 0, m3 =

−(18λL +9)
4β(λL +11)

≤ 0, where the signs

follow from the fact that, under Assumption 1, λL only can be equal to 0 (in case 1) or 1/2 (in cases 2
b∗
and 3). The fact that qL
(p0 , αL ) is necessarily linear comes from the fact that both qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) and p∗0

are linear and hence, in the systems of equations set above, any non-linear term must be zero to ensure
that the market-clearing condition holds for any pair (αL , αF ).
Plugging (39) in the bidding function, we ﬁnd the equilibrium allocation in the auction:

A∗
qL0
=

β Q̄+3αL −2µL −(2λL +1)αF
7β

qFA∗0 =

,

2µL +(2λL +1)αF +6βQ̄−3αL
.
7β

(40)

b∗
The third step is to show that qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) and qL
(p0 , αL ) constitute an equilibrium of the game. By

construction, p∗0 is an equilibrium price and qFb∗ is the best strategy for F for the same arguments used
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b∗
in Section 3. So, we only have to show that qL
(p0 , αL ) is the best strategy for L, what amounts to
A∗
proving that the value of qL0
given in (40) solves (21). To prove this, note that, for a speciﬁc value of

αF , solving (23) in terms of p0 is totally equivalent to solving it in terms of qL0 . Therefore, we conclude
that (22) provides an allocation for L that maximizes π L for any possible value of αF , what implies that
it also maximizes it on average and, therefore, he have solved (21). The equilibrium is unique since both
b∗
qFb∗ (p0 , αF ) and qL
(p0 , αL ) are unique.

If is only left to prove that there exists a set of parameters such that the solution is interior.
Using (5), (6), (25), (39) and (40), and rearranging, we conclude that the occurrence of an interior
solution w.p.1 requires that the following conditions hold:

Pr −13β Q̄ ≤ 2µF + (2λF + 8)αF − 10αL ≤ 8β Q̄

= 1,

(41)

Pr −6β Q̄ ≤ 2µF + (2λF + 1)αF − 3αL ≤ β Q̄

= 1,

(42)

Pr 13β Q̄ ≤ 10αL + (13 − 2λF )αF − 2µF

= 1,

(43)

Pr 44β Q̄ ≤ 4(µF + (λF + 11)αF ) + 15αL

= 1.

(44)

The ﬁrst condition guarantees interior solution for quantities in the secondary market26 (0 ≤ qi1 ≤ Q̄)
and the second does the same for the auction (0 ≤ qi0 ≤ Q̄). The third and fourth conditions ensure that
the price is non-negative in the secondary market and the auction respectively (p1 ≥ 0, p0 ≥ 0).
If we include the assumption of uniform distribution and we restrict ourselves to the three cases considered in Assumption 1, using the relevant expressions for µL and λL conditions (41) to (44), collapse to
the following equations:
Case 1 (independent types): 2σ ≤ β Q̄ ≤
Case 2 (L eﬃcient): 2σ ≤ β Q̄ ≤
Case 3 (F eﬃcient): σ ≤ β Q̄ ≤

63θ
44

+

σ
22 ;

63θ
44 ;

63θ
44

+

σ
22 .

If θ is large enough with respect to σ, the sets deﬁned by these conditions are clearly non-empty.

6.9

Proof of Proposition 7

The ﬁrst part is readily proved by comparing the relevant expressions for prices and quantities and doing
some straight-forward algebra. The strategy to prove the second part is to show that h(δ A , α) > h(δ G , α)
for all the relevant values of the parameters. In turn, this is done by minimizing h(δ A , α) − h(δ G , α) in
terms of αL and αF and showing that the minimum value is positive, what implies that it is positive for
any combination of αL and αF . First, note that in all three cases h(δ A , α) − h(δ G , α) is a continuous and
26 Notice that condition (4) guarantees interior solution in the secondary market for any initial allocation of permits, whereas
(41) guarantees it only for the auction allocation considered in this section. Furthermore, we write the conditions in terms of
probabilities and not in terms of parameters, as in (4). In order to present these conditions in terms of parameters, it suﬃces
to consider the most adverse realizations for each inequality.
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bounded function deﬁned on a compact set and, therefore, we can use the Weierstrass theorem to state
that there exists a minimum in the relevant interval. Although the strategy of the proof is the same for all
three cases in Assumption 1, the development is slightly diﬀerent for each case and so we consider them
separately.
CASE 1: αL and αF are not correlated. Using (10), (12), (17) and (40), the diﬀerence between total
cost under auctioning and grandfathering can be written as
h(δ A , α) − h(δ G , α) =

1
196βQ̄

−24α2F − 48α2L + 88αL αF − 2αF 20θ + 10σ + 25β Q̄
2

+2αL 4θ + 2σ + 5β Q̄ + 4 (2θ + σ) + 25β 2 Q̄2 + 20β Q̄ (2θ + σ) ,
the sign of which is determined by the term in square brackets, which we denote as ∆1 (αL , αF ). For the
relevant values of the parameters we have

∂∆
∂αL

> 0 and

∂∆
∂αF

< 0, what implies that ∆ (αL , αF ) reaches a

minimum at (αL , αF ) = (θ, θ + σ) . Using these values, we get ∆1 (θ, θ + σ) = −40σ2 − 30σβ Q̄ + 25β 2 Q̄2 ,
which is always positive under the interior solution condition 2σ < β Q̄.
CASE 2: αL ≤ αF . In this case we have E {αL } = θ + σ3 , E {αF } = θ +

2σ
3 ,

what implies δ G =

3θ+2σ
6θ+3σ

and, using (10), (12), (18) and (40), the diﬀerence of total cost between both systems can be written as
h(δ A , α) − h(δ G , α) =

1
49βQ̄X 2

X 2 −10α2F − 12α2L + 23αL αF + αF −X 2 3θ + 32β Q̄ + 49β Q̄XY

+αL X 2 θ + 27β Q̄ − 49β Q̄XY + β 2 Q̄2 225θ (θ + σ) + 44σ2 + X 2 θ2 + 5θβ Q̄
where X := (6θ + 3σ), Y = (3θ + 2σ). Denote as ∆2 (αL , αF ) the term in curly brackets, what determines
the sign of the whole expression. Now we solve the problem of minimizing ∆2 (αL , αF ) subject to αL ≥ θ,
αF ≤ θ + σ and αL ≤ αF . We conclude that there are two candidates that satisfy the ﬁrst-order KuhnTucker conditions. The ﬁrst candidate is αL = θ, αF = θ + σ and the second one is αL = αF = θ + σ.27
For the ﬁrst candidate we have
∆2 (θ, θ + σ) = σX β Q̄ (−45θ + 2σ) − 10σX + β 2 Q̄2 225θ (θ + σ) + 44σ2 > 0,

where the inequality comes from the fact that ∆2 (θ, θ + σ) is increasing in β Q̄ for any β Q̄ > 2σ (which
is a required condition to guarantee interior solution) and replacing β Q̄ by 2σ we get ∆2 (θ, θ + σ) >
σ2 334θσ + 98σ 2 > 0. Analogously, for the second candidate we have
∆2 (θ + σ, θ + σ) = σX 2 σ − 5β Q̄ + β 2 Q̄2 225θ (θ + σ) + 44σ 2 > 0

where, again, the inequality comes from the fact that ∆2 (θ + σ, θ + σ) is increasing in β Q̄ for any β Q̄ > 2σ
27 The

second is a candidate only if σ and β Q̄ are high enough as compared to θ.
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and replacing β Q̄ by 2σ we get ∆2 (θ + σ, θ + σ) > σ2 576θ2 + 95σ2 + 414θσ > 0.
G
σ
CASE 3: αF ≤ αL . In this case we have E {αL } = θ + 2σ
3 , E {αF } = θ + 3 and, therefore, δ =

3θ+σ
6θ+3σ .

Using (10), (12), (19) and (40), the diﬀerence of total cost between auctioning and grandfathering can be
written as
h(δ A , α) − h(δ G , α) =

1
49βQ̄X 2

X 2 −10α2F − 12α2L + 23αL αF

+αF 49β Q̄XZ − X 2 3θ + 3σ + 32β Q̄

+ αL X 2 θ + σ + 27β Q̄ − 49β Q̄XZ

+ (θ + σ) 5β Q̄ + (θ + σ) + β 2 Q̄2 [49Z (X − Z) − 6]
where X := (6θ + 3σ), Z = (3θ + σ). Denote as ∆3 (αL , αF ) the term in curly brackets, what determines
the sign of the whole expression. We conclude that the only candidate that satisﬁes the Kuhn-Tucker
ﬁrst-order conditions to minimize ∆3 (αL , αF ) subject to αF ≥ θ, αL ≤ θ + σ and αF ≤ αL is αL = θ + σ,
αF = θ. Evaluating ∆3 (αL , αF ) for this candidate we get
∆3 (θ + σ, θ) = −10σ 2 X 2 + β Q̄σX (45θ + 47σ) + β 2 Q̄2 225θ (θ + σ) + 44σ 2
> σ2 [X (45θ + 47σ − 10X) + (225θ (θ + σ) + 44)] > 0,

where the ﬁrst inequality comes from the fact that ∆3 (θ, θ + σ) is increasing in β Q̄ and then we can use
β Q̄ = σ to obtain a lower bound.

6.10

Proof of Corollary 3

Consider an arbitrary value of the (monotone transformation of) total cost h, say h. For grandfathering,
denote as ΦG h̃ := α / h(δ G , α) ≤ h̃ the set of values of the types, (αL , αF ), such that the cost under
grandfathering is not larger than h̃. Similarly, deﬁne ΦA h̃ := α / h(δ A , α) ≤ h̃ for the auction. From
Proposition 7 we know that, for any realization of the types, we have h(δ G , α) ≤ h(δ A , α). In particular,
this will be the case for those types contained in ΦA h̃ . Then, we conclude that ΦA h̃ is included in
ΦG h̃ or, in other words, F A h̃ ≤ F G h̃ for any value of h̃, where F A and F G are the distribution
functions of h under auctioning and grandfathering respectively, what implies FOSD of G over A.
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7

Appendix 2: Figures

Figure 1: Equilibria for independent types when κ < 2 . Type-1, 2 and 3 equilibria arise in green,
yellow and blue regions respectively.
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Figure 2: Realized Costs with (σ, β Q̄) = (6, 8) and θ = 10. Each dot corresponds to a realization of α
and it is displayed in the upper (resp. lower) panel if, for that realization, total cost under auctioning is
smaller (higher) than that under grandfathering. In the upper panel the colours ranges from yellow to
red, where yellow means both costs are roughly similar to each other and red means a larger diﬀerence
from one to another. In the lower panel the colours range from yellow to blue, where yellow means again
similar costs.

39
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

39

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 851 [2013]

Figure 3: Allocations in terms of δ :=

qF 0
,
Q̄

with independent types and (σ, β Q̄) = (6, 8) and θ = 10.

The green points represent auction vs. cost minimizing allocations for each realization of α, thus the
closer those points are to the diagonal (red line), the more cost-eﬀective the auction allocation is. The
blue line represents the grandfathering allocation (which is constant and equal to 1/2). Grandfathering is
cost-eﬀective if δ CE =
under-assigned) if δ CE >

1
2

1
2

(which corresponds to αL = αF ) and L gets over-assigned (resp.

(δ CE < 12 ). In the vast majority of the realizations, δ A < δ CE , i.e., auctioning

allocates more permits to the leader than what is cost-eﬀective.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium conﬁguration for cases 2 and 3 when κ takes a value to enable all three types of
equilibria. Type-1, 2 and 3 equilibria arise in green, yellow and blue regions respectively.
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Figure 5: Expected costs under auctioning (A) and grandfathering (G) in case 3. For each realization,
we compute expected cost under A and G and we average across 1,000 random realizations. A red
(green) dot indicates that G (A) entails lower expected cost. In cases 2 and 3 all the dots would be red.
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Figure 6: Allocations for type-3 equilibria in case 3 with (σ, β Q̄) = (6, 8) and θ = 10. The interpretation
is the same as Figure 3.
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